Introduction

•
The factors that determine the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) of large U.S. corporations have attracted significant academic attention during the past decade (Rosen. 1992) . This interest arises for a variety of reasons. First, CEOs of large U.S. corporations control the deployment of large numbers of workers and substantial physical and financial assets. The effectiveness of the market for CEOs in allocating managerial talent within corporate hierarchies and across firms is therefore of considerable interest. Second, the dispersion of ownership suggests that the structure of compensation contracts is of considerable importance for resolving potential conflicts arising from the separation of ownership and management. Finally, nominal CEO compensation has been high and rising, and has attracted considerable attention in the debate over increased income inequality (e.g., Bok, 1993) .
Both academic research and popular commentaries on CEO compensation arrangements have raised questions about the efficiency and equity attributes of CEO compensation. On one extreme are Jensen and Murphy (1990) , who argue that CEO compensation is not sufficiently sensitive to firm financial performance and suggest that this may be due to political considerations that constrain the upper level of CEO compensation (see, however, Haubrich (1994) ). On the other extreme is Crystal (1991) , who argues that executive compensation typically is controlled de facto by the CEO rather than by the board of directors, and that many CEOs are overcompensated as a result. The arguments over excessive CHO pay are echoed in media coverage and associated public opinion polls that suggest a widespread view that CEOs of large corporations are paid too much.
Over the past two years, media attention and public reaction to reports of high CEO compensation levels have led Congress to change the tax treatment of CEO compensation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to expand public reporting obligations about CEO compensation and firm performance, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to consider new accounting rules for stock options, which often are a significant component of CEO compensation. The real effects of this attention and the political responses to it are uncertain, however.' To the extent that political constraints become binding, they may either limit "excessive" CEO compensation (i.e., reduce any shareholder rents appropriated by the CEO) or distort CEO performance incentives and the allocation of managerial talent by reducing compensation from efficient levels. This study investigates the presence of political constraints on CEO compensation within one sector. While we can identify the impact on CEO compensation of various measures of political constraints, we cannot determine whether these have merely redistributive effects or also have adverse efficiency consequences.
We focus our analysis on the regulated sector, and on the electric utility industry in particular. Previous research has demonstrated that CEOs of firms subject to economic regulation eam significantly less than do CEOs of unregulated firms, all else equal (see Carroll and Ciscel (1982) and Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) and the references they cite). Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) argue that these differences reflect, at least in part, political constraints on executive compensation imposed directly or indirectly by the regulatory environment in which these firms operate. They support their argument by examining relative CEO compensation levels between regulated and unregulated firms, across industries subject to different types of regulation (e.g., state versus federal; firm level versus industry level), and across different organizational structures for regulated firms (e.g., multistate holding companies versus operating companies). They also explore changes in relative compensation levels over time as regulatory environments change, and differences in the sensitivity of pay to firm performance across the regulated and unregulated sectors. The results are consistent with Jensen and Murphy's (1990) argument that political constraints reduce both the level of CEO compensation and its sensitivity to firm performance.
Political constraints could affect CEO compensation in two ways. Eirst, they may alter the basic regulatory mechanisms used in a particular industry, changing the "optimal" compensation arrangements. For example, if economic regulation reduces the complexity of the CEO's job or limits his ability to influence firm performance, it may be efficient for the boards of regulated firms to pay CEOs less, to tie pay less closely to firm financial performance, and to hire less-able CEOs.^ This would generate compensation discounts for CEOs of regulated firms relative to unregulated firms, suggesting that observed variations in pay across industries could be due, in whole or in part, to unmeasured (and unmeasurable) differences in "CEO productivity" rather than to direct political constraints (see Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) and the comments by Meyer (1993), and Peltzman (1993) ). Political constraints also may affect CEO compensation by placing direct political pressure on CEO compensation through the regulatory process. That is, boards of directors may take regulatory and political responses to high observed CEO pay into account when they make compensation decisions.
It is difficult to fully separate these possible effects. Previous research (e.g., Joskow. Rose, and Shepard, 1993 ) that relies on interindustry comparisons necessarily captures some mixture of both. This article attempts to isolate the direct effect of political constraints on CEO compensation by concentrating on a single industry: the U.S. electric utility industry. As discussed in Joskow. Rose, and Shepard (1993) , the characteristics of electric utility regulation are particularly conducive to exerting effective direct pressure on CEO compensation, and CEOs in this sector average considerably less compensation than their equivalent counterparts in all other industries. Further, electric utilities are for the most part regulated at the state level, and there is considerable variation in the political activism and orientation of public utility commissions, both over time and across states. The large number of electric utilities and distinct regulatory jurisdictions allows us to explore the impact of this regulatory variation within a single industry. There is, moreover, little difference in the CEO's role and activities across firms within this industry. Focusing on CEOs within a single industry therefore largely avoids the potential correlation of unmeasured CEO job attributes witb variations in regulatory environment. By focusing on a single industry with the same basic regulatory instruments used to regulate all firms, this study is also more likely to capture the direct effects of political constraints on CEO compensation. The primary drawback to this approach is that intraindustry variation in politico-regulatory constraints is likely to be substantially less important than the interindustry variation upon which previous studies have relied, which may make it more difficult to identify significant effects of these constraints.
The empirical methodology that we employ is straightforward. We specify and estimate a standard CEO compensation equation to which we have added variables designed to capture variations in the political environment faced by electric utilities. We first examine the correlation of investment bank rankings of a firm's regulatory environment with CEO compensation. These rankings characterize the relative weights that regulators give to investor and consumer interests. The political constraint hypothesis suggests that regulatory agencies that give more weight to consumer interests will be more likely to constrain CEO compensation. We next examine how economic variables that affect regulatory stringency influence compensation. Joskow (1974 Joskow ( , 1989 and Hendricks (1975) have shown that regulatory constraints are more likely to be binding when firms must raise their prices to maintain their allowed rates of retum. We therefore use changes in electricity rates as well as rate levels across different customer groups as indirect measures of regulatory tightness. Third, we examine the influence of customer composition on compensation, reflecting Joskow's (1972) demonstration that organized intervention in regulatory proceedings can affect the outcome of the regulatory process (see also Anderson (1980) ). Finally, we examine several aspects of public utility commission (PUC) organization and composition.
Our results suggest that political pressures, operating through state regulatory commissions, influence the compensation of CEOs in the electric utility industry. Firms subject to regulation by agencies ranked as more consumer-oriented pay their CEOs less than do firms operating in regulatory environments ranked as more neutral or favorable to investors. CEOs are on average paid less when their utility's rates are high and rising than when rates are relatively low and stable or declining. This effect is most pronounced for residential rates. CEOs are also paid less when they serve a larger number of industrial customers, all else equal. We interpret this as reflecting the greater likelihood that industrial customers, as a group, will be able to infiuence the regulatory process. We also find that CEOs of utilities operating in states where tbe commissioners are elected are paid less than CEOs of comparable firms operating in states where the commissioners are appointed by the governor. Other attributes of commissioner appointment and tenure rules also appear to affect CEO compensation in ways that are consistent with the political constraint hypothesis.
TTie remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the conceptual framework used to evaluate political pressure on CEO salaries at electric utilities and discuss the variables used to measure political pressure. Section 3 describes the data and model specification. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4, followed by a brief conclusion.
2. Regulatory/political constraints on CEO compensation
The literature on the political economy of regulation describes regulatory responses to pressures exerted by competing interest groups (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Noll, 1989) . The process through which various interest groups may infiuence regulatory behavior may be quite complex. We have identified a number of possible channels through which political pressures may lead to direct constraints on CEO compensation for regulated firms.F irst, and perhaps most important, high levels of CEO compensation generally are unpopular with the public and attract attention from consumers, legislators, and others concemed about "high" electric rates."* CHO compensation is a "red button" that tends to attract considerable media attention and is a natural target for consumer groups trying to focus attention on cost and rate issues within the regulatory process. Despite its negligible impact on electricity prices, the chief executive's pay may serve as a focal point for groups alleging that a regulated firm has excessive costs. Its visibility provides regulators with a natural opportunity to demonstrate that they are "tough" on regulated firms and are protecting consumer interests. This opportunity is likely to be most attractive for commissions that are more consumer-oriented and responsive to interest groups seeking lower rates. Utility boards operating in such environments have strong incentives to suppress CEO pay and thereby reduce the likelihood that reports of high CEO compensation will trigger costly adverse regulatory rulings.Ŵ e use measures of the responsiveness of regulatory commissions to public pressures to capture the extent to which consumer groups may directly or indirectly influence compensation through this channel. A number of investment firms systematically rate the regulatory climate faced by individual electric utilities. These rankings, which are separate from the performance ratings of a utility's equity and bonds, inform investors of the degree to which the regulatory process favors the company's ratepayers ' Our view of how political pressures on CEO compensation can be amplified and affected through the economic regulatory process is di.scussed in considerable detail in Jo.skow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) .
•* See, for example. Ricardo Sandoval. "Debate Over Pay for Utility Execs," San Francisco Examiner. September 5, 1993. pp. E-1, E-4 to E-5; and Jonathan Marshall. "Watchdogs Put Leash on Utility Execs' Pay," San Francisco Chronicle. February 13. 1995, pp. Dl. D2.
• Of course, the board may misjudge public reaction to reports of high CEO compensation. The recent decision by the board of Long Island Lighting Company to give its CEO a significant salary increase produced substantial public protest. Ultimately the CEO declined the offered increa.se. See John McQuiston, "Lilco Chairman Declines a Much-Criticized Increase in His $580,000 Salary," The New York Times. February 24, 1995. p. B6. versus its shareholders.^ A climate that favors ratepayers presumably will be one in which there is more pressure to keep CEO salaries low.' The ratings generally are not determined by precise mathematical formulas, but reflect at least in part relatively objective criteria. For instance, Salomon Brothers, whose ratings we use in this study, considers state regulatory agencies' positions on the allowed return on equity, the inclusion of construction work in progress in rate base without an allowance for funds used during construction offset, the disallowance of construction or purchased power costs from recovery from ratepayers, the use of settlements to resolve outstanding requests, the effect of judicial decisions on the utilities, the use of phase-in rate increase plans, the time required to reach a decision, and the use of interim rates.Î nvestment bank rankings also reflect analysts' subjective evaluation of the regulatory climates faced by different firms. This component of the Salomon Brothers index is likely to be particularly informative, as the rankings were constructed over our entire study period by a single analyst, an individual who was widely acknowledged to be a leading expert on the electric utility industry."* Overall, the rankings appear to provide good summary measures of the political environment created for an electric utility by its regulators. We expect that political pressures from the public, as mediated through the legislative, executive, and regulatory process, will be more aggressively articulated in regulatory environments that are characterized as "proconsumer" using rankings such as these.'" Second, political pressures are likely to be more effective when there is a convenient local public forum that both highlights executive compensation and provides a mechanism to "punish" firms perceived to pay their CEOs "too much."" Formal rate hearings provide such a forum. Joskow (1974) and Hendricks (1975) demonstrate that regulatory constraints are more likely to bind when firms are involved in formal regulatory rate reviews, which tend to be more frequent when rates are rising than when they are stable or declining.
Third, political pressures on compensation are likely to be more intense when interest and participation in regulatory proceedings are high. Active participation in rate hearings by consumer groups can provide direct pressures on regulators to constrain visible CEO compensation along with other costs.'^ Participation and interest generally appear greatest when rate increases are large, even if rate levels are relatively low, and when overall rate levels are relatively high, even if rates are not increasing particularly rapidly. For example, in states such as California and New York, with high nominal "These rankings capture the regulation-induced risk the firm faces. For instance, a firm operating in a regulatory climate in which ratepayers are favored would be more likely to be required to absorb a large, unexpected expense (such as hurricane-related costs).
'' Firms in risky settings could, in response, require more-able CEOs and therefore have to offer higher salaries. Our empirical resuhs indicate that Ihis is not the case. This effect could, however, temper our results so that they reflect a smaller correlation between political pressure and CEO salaries than in fact exists, * We focus on the Salomon Brothers rankings in the empirical section because they were available to us over a longer time period than any other firm's rankings. There is no evidence that investment firm researchers consider CEO compensation directly in determining their rankings.
" In ihe Appendix we list some examples of the average Salomon Brothers ranking for several utilities in our sample. The higher the value, the more consumer-oriented the public utility commission that has jurisdiction over each utility.
'"Other investment banks rank states instead of individual utilities. Rankings for individual firms are important to us for two reasons. First, they account for utilities thai operate in more than one state and, therefore, deal with more than one regulatory commission. Second, occasionally the rankings capture variations within a state in the relationship between different utilities and the regulatory commission.
" Punishment may, for example, take the form of excluding all or pan of executive compensation from recoverable costs, or using low-end estimates of capital costs to calculate allowable rates of return.
'^See California Public Utilities Commission Decisioti 91-12-076, 1991, pp. 40-44, rates, consumer groups appear to be much more active in regulatory proceedings than they are in states with low nominal rates.'Ĉ ustomer mix and relative rates across customer groups are likely to affect the intensity of these constraints. Residential rates are likely to be a significant determinant of political pressure. These customers tend to be represented by a designated govemment official, such as the state attorney general or a state corporate counsel''' and are therefore represented regardless of their number. For nonresidential customers, participation and influence in rate hearings are likely to depend not only on rates but also on the size of the group in the utility's customer base. Industrial users often find it worthwhile to represent themselves as a group, since their interests may conflict with those of residential customers.'' The incentive to organize and the effectiveness of this representation are likely to depend not only on industrial rate levels and changes, but also on the importance of industrial customers in the utility's business and the average size of its industrial customers.'^ Finally, because residential and industrial customers tend to be better represented than commercial customers in utility regulatory rate proceedings, political pressures on regulators are probably more dependent on rates for these classes than on rates for commercial or other customer classes,'T hese factors suggest that companies with rising rates and those with relatively high rate levels will face more severe regulatory and political pressures on a broad set of cost components, including CEO compensation."* Utilities with more significant industrial sales and larger industrial customers also are likely to face greater constraints on costs and possible executive compensation levels.
Fourth, the rules goveming how regulators are selected and the attributes of their appointments may affect their sensitivity to political pressures over executive compensation. For example, elected commissioners may be more sensitive to public concem and more interested in making "high-profile" cost disallowances that will attract media attention. Longer term lengths for commissioners could reduce their susceptibility to such political pressure. Commissioners' backgrounds (such as previous public or private sector employment) also may influence their predisposition toward constraining executive compensation. Precisely how commission-and commissioner-specific attributes interact with one another to mediate political pressures is uncertain, however. Navarro (1982) demonstrates that regulatory rankings by investment bankers are weakly associated with these types of measures, although research that examines the effects of these attributes on prices, rates of retum, and costs is fairly inconclusive (see Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) ; Smiley and Greene (1983); Costello (1984) and the references they cite). We analyze whether and how a variety of commission attributes affect CEO compensation levels.
" It is also of interest that most of the recent regulatory activity focused on restructuring and on retail competition in the electric power industry has occurred in states with relatively high electric rates (e.g., Califomia, New York. Connecticut, and Rhode Island) or in states with powerful industrial groups (e.g., Michigan). '•' Some states (e.g., California) have active, independently organized consumer groups that represent either residential or large industrial customers in regulatory proceedings.
" This conflici makes it risky for industrial users to rely on the government representative. '* Large industrial users may be able to influence utilities directly: tbeir interests need not be mediated through the regulatory agency. For instance, they may threaten to self generate if rates are "too high."
" The relative lack of political clout of the commercial class is consistent with the widely held view (in the United States as well as other countries) that margins tend to be higher for commercial customers (given the operating and capital costs incurred to serve them) than for other customer classes.
' * Rate levels may be positively correlated with CEO salaries through, for example, geographic market effects. Utilities in high-cost areas are likely to have both high rates and high labor costs, including high executive salaries: compare, for instance. Boston Edison to Montana Power. Our empirical analysis conditions on such utility-specific effects in the regression models.
Data and empirical modei
• Our empirical compensation equation models salary and bonus as a function of the political pressure faced by a utility, firm and CEO characteristics, and time-and firm-specific fixed effects. The specification, based on relatively standard compensation equations in the literature, is similar to models used by Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) and Joskow and Rose (1994) :
In (SALARY ,j,) for CEO (• in firm j and year t. y, is a year-specific effect that reflects compensation trends common to all electric utilities in a given year, fij is a firm-specific error, and e^j, is a random disturbance term assumed to be orthogonal to the rest of the model. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of observations on 87 companies over the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] .'^ The variables included in the analysis are described below, and their summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . All dollar amounts are in constant 1990 dollars unless otherwise noted.
• CEO compensation. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the CEO's annual salary and bonus, \n(SALARY). The primary source for this variable was Eorbes" annual survey of CEO compensation, as compiled by Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) . Approximately 65 electric utilities are represented in these data. We supplemented the data with information from proxy statements to increase the number of utilities covered in our dataset to 87.
Executive compensation typically includes a number of components, which may include base salary, cash bonus, deferred compensation, corporate contributions to a savings plan, a variety of benefits and perks, stock awards, and stock options or appreciation rights. Eorbes reports compensation in three main categories: salary and bonus, gains from the exercise of stock options or appreciation rights, and other compensation. We have replicated these categories with information from proxy statements to the extent possible. Our analysis focuses on salary and bonus, since the proxy statements consistently provide sufficient information to replicate salary and bonus but not always enough detail to recreate the other components of total compensation. For electric utilities, salary and bonus captures almost all of a CEO's compensation (on average, 95% in our sample), and results using total compensation are essentially identical to those reported below.
• CEO characteristics. We control for a number of CEO characteristics that have previously been found to affect CEO compensation (see, e,g., Rosen (1992) and Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) ). These include the CEO's age at the time he^" was appointed to his current position {APT-AGE), his tenure in office {CEO TENURE), and an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO was hired from outside the utility, as opposed to promoted from within the corporate hierarchy {OUTSIDER)}^ These data '" Our sample was limited to the companies and time period for which Salomon Brothers rankings were available.
'" None of the CEOs in the dataset is female. ' Following Joskow, Rose, and Sbepard (1993), a CEO is defined to be an outsider if he was employed by the company for three or fewer years before becoming CEO-are available in the Eorbes survey or the proxy statements, depending on the source for the salary observation. D Firm characteristics. We control for a number of firm characteristics that are likely to affect CEO compensation levels. These include firm size, financial performance, and measures of organizational structure, as well as firm-specific effects. Eirm size and financial performance data were obtained from the COMPUSTAT Utility Tapes. Information on organizational structure was based on a review of utility annual reports, lOK filings, and financial analysts" reports on utility diversification.
Perhaps the most consistent finding in the CEO compensation literature is the strong and precise positive relationship between firm size and CEO pay (Rosen (1992) and references cited therein). Firm size typically is measured by revenues, although alternative indicia such as assets and employees may capture interindustry differences in firm scale, organization and management requirements (Joskow. Rose, and Shepard, 1993) . For consistency with their study, we use ASSETS and EMPLOYEES as the measure of firm size.^Â n extensive literature investigates the influence of firm financial performance on executive pay (see Rosen (1992) and Joskow and Rose (1994) for references). Firm financial performance in this study is measured by stock market rates of return. Following Joskow and Rose (1994), we include current, one-year, and two-year lags in returns. Specifications that include accounting returns do not add significantly to the explanatory power of our model for our sample of utility executives.^^ We also explore specifications that allow the coefficients of the return variables to depend on the regulatory environment. These provide an intraindustry test of Jensen and Murphy's (1990) hypothesis that the link between executive pay and firm performance is weakened by political constraints on the upper end of compensation.-'* Our final firm characteristics are two variables that capture attributes of a utility's organizational structure: EXEMPT and DIVERSE. EXEMPT is an indicator variable equal to one if the utility is organized as an exempt holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. The holding company structure implies that the CEO is the chief executive of the holding company, not solely of the regulated electric utility. If this enables the company to "shelter" part of the CEO's compensation from direct regulatory review, EXEMPT should be positively correlated with CEO compensation. Reorganization into exempt holding companies, so that a holding company became the parent of the regulated utility, became relatively popular during the 1980s.
The holding company structure also facilitates diversification into nonutility businesses by affecting a clear separation between the utilities regulated and unregulated activities. DIVERSE, which captures the extent to which this diversification was pursued by the utility, is a dummy variable set equal to one if the utility has achieved "significant diversification" into nonutility lines of business.^^ Diversification may affect compensation through both changes in the CEO's inherent productivity and relaxation of -^ Most coefficients are robust to measuring scale by either revenues or assets and employees. Because firm revenues are quite correlated with rate levels, however, the coefficient.^ on both firm size and rate levels change when scale is measured by revenues. Implied scale elasticities are roughly constant across specifications for assets and employees.
" This contrasts with the strong role that accounting returns appear to play in results for regulated industries overall (Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993) and in unregulated industries (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993; and Joskow and Rose, 1994) . This null result is particularly surprising given the focus of utility regulation and many utility managerial compensation contracts on accounting rates of retum.
-'' The results of Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) suggest that the pay-for-performance relationship is weaker for regulated industries than it is for unregulated industries, consistent with this argument. "This assessment is based on our review of the sources described earlier. Among the factors we considered were the fractions of revenues, costs, and assets in nonutility businesses, discussions of diversification plan.s in annual reports, and perceptions of stock analysts. 
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NO QUALIFICATIONS (I = no) regulatory constraints, both of which imply positive correlations between DIVERSE and compensation. Managing substantially diversified enterprises may require greater skills on the pan of the CEO; firms that diversify into nonutility businesses therefore may have to pay more to attract CEOs with the necessary qualifications (Rose and Shepard, 1994) . At the same time, regulatory pressures on CEO compensation may be reduced by diversification. For example, the availability of nonutility revenues may enable a firm to charge part (or even all) of the CEO's compensation to unregulated subsidiaries, removing it from direct regulatory review. The interpretation of results for these organizational variables may be cleanest for exempt holding companies that have not undertaken significant diversification (EXEMPT equals one, DIVERSE equals zero). In these firms, the job of the CEO remains largely unchanged. The holding company structure may, however, provide a rationalization for higher CEO pay and an opportunity to obscure the magnitude of total compensation in rate proceedings by charging part of the CEO's salary to unregulated affiliates and reducing the amount charged to the regulated utility. If this effect is important, we expect a positive coefficient on EXEMPT in models that control for the value of DIVERSE.
-...
Our analysis omits a number of firm-specific characteristics, including local wage rates., cost of living, production cost characteristics, diversification into other regulated products such as gas or steam, local media attributes, and the firm's reputation with regulators for being efficient or inefficient. Because these unmeasured attributes may be correlated with one or more of our measures of political constraints, we include firm-specific fixed effects in our model. Tests for the exogeneity of unmeasured firmspecific independent variables reject exogeneity for all specifications, as reported below.
o Regulatory and political environment. Our primary measure of regulatory environment is Salomon Brothers' rankings of utilities' regulatory climates.^^ The rankings, available twice-annually between 1978 and 1990, rate the political climate facing individual utilities using a 13-part letter scale ranging from A to E (with pluses and minuses). SALOMON BROS is the annual average of a numerical transformation of the letter grades (where A, representing a utility-friendly climate, is one and E, representing a climate that favors ratepayers, is thirteen). The higher the value of SALOMON BROS. the more consumer-oriented the commission is and, according to our hypothesis, the lower CEO compensation will be. We report estimates of the compensation equation in which the Salomon Brothers rankings enter linearly, though we also examine the pattem of coefficients on separate dummy variables for each grade.
Our second set of measures, refiecting variations in rates and customer mix, are from the COMPUSTAT Utility Tapes. Residential (RES. RATE) and industrial (IND. RATE) rates were calculated by dividing a company's total residential (industrial) revenue by its total kilowatt-hour sales to residential (industrial) customers.^^ RES. RATE GROWTH and IND. RATE GROWTH measure the nominal growth rate in the residential and industrial rates, and are defined as the ratio of current rates to the previous year's rates, minus one. IND. CUSTOMERS is the fraction of a utility's total customers that are industrial users, and IND. AVG. USE is their per-capita consumption in gigawatt-hours.
The final set of regulatory variables reflects characteristics of each state's regulatory agency, and were obtained from annual issues of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners' Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation, 1978-1990 . For multistate utilities, the data were transformed from state-level data to firm-level data using weights based on the proportion of the utility's sales in each state.^** These variables include: ELECTED, equal to one for states with elected public utility commissioners; \n(CHAIR SALARY), the natural log of the state public utility commission chair's salary;^^ TERM, the length of commissioners' terms; NO QUALI-FICATIONS, equal to one for states that do not have statutory qualification requirements for commissioners; and PUBLIC, equal to one for states that have one or more '''We al.so experimented with Merrill Lynch rankings of the states" regulatory climates, assigning a sales-weighted average ranking to firms that operate in more ihan one state. These rankings were available only for 1985 and later. Our results were very similar to results using the Salomon Brothers rankings, but arc much less preci.scly estimated due to the shorter time period.
" This construction implies that rates will reflect usage patterns. For instance, since electric utilities charge industrial customers both for energy and capacity use, a utility whose industrial customers have high capacity and tow energy needs will appear to have high rates. We assume that customers" usage patterns are lixed over time, so the firm-tixed effects eliminate this phenomenon. Moreover, there is no theoretical link between usage charges and CEO salaries.
-''The weights are constructed from data for 1988, the earliest year for which the Department of Energy's Energy information Administration published sales breakdowns by states. Because company sales by state are relatively constant over time, we did not vary the weight except to make adjustments for companies that acquired an operating subsidiary in a new state during our sample period.^ If a range was reported for the chair's salary, we took the midpoint of the range.
commissioners previously employed in the public sector, for instance, as a state legislator.
Empirical resuits
• Results from specifications that include the Salomon Brothers rankings and measures of a utility's economic climate are summarized in Table 2 . Because preliminary analysis indicated that there are strong correlations between the firm-specific errors and several of the independent variables, all specifications are estimated with year-and firm-fixed effects.'" The coefficients on CEO and firm characteristics are quite stable across all specifications, and the estimates are similar to those of previous studies (Rosen, 1992; Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993) . The estimated coefficients on the regulatory variables generally are consistent with the predicted negative signs for all variables.
Tbe results for SALOMON BROS, which are robust to the inclusion of the economic climate variables, suggest that regulatory environments that favor ratepayers over shareholders are associated with low CEO salaries. The magnitude of the coefficient (.023 to .026, with a standard error of about .006) implies that a two-step improvement in a utility's grade, for example from C to B-, is associated with a 4% to 5% increase in the CEO salary."
We also have explored specifications in which SALOMON BROS, is not constrained to have a log-linear effect on compensation. Figure 1 compares the impact of SALOMON BROS, when the rankings enter the log(compensation) equation linearly (represented by the solid line) with the pattern of effects estimated from separate dummy variables for each grade level (represented by the circles, which are scaled to reflect the number of observations in each category). The results suggest some nonlinearity, with the most consumer-oriented commissions having proportionately larger impacts on CEO compensation."
Columns II through VI explore the impact on CEO compensation of current rate levels and rate growth over the previous two years. Columns II and III report results for residential rates: II includes only the level of residential rates. III includes both levels and growth. Residential rate levels have a strong negative effect on CEO compensation in both specifications, although the impact is somewhat smaller once we control for rate changes. The results in column II imply an elasticity of compensation witb respect to residential rate levels of 17% (standard error, 9%), suggesting that a utility with residential rates 20% higher than those of an otherwise comparable utility will pay its CEO on average 3.5% less.'-* Nominal rate growth has an additional depressive effect on CEO compensation, with most of the impact coming from lagged rate growth. The coefficient on RES. RATE GROWTH, t -1 implies that an increase of ten percentage points in the nominal growth rate (e.g., from 5% to 15%, about one standard deviation from the mean) reduces CEO compensation by about 2%.''' These results provide strong support for the hypothesis that high and increasing rates both "'The exogeneity of the fimi-specific fixed effects was rejected at the tO% confidence level or better for every set of results in Tables 2 and 3 ( Hausman (1978) ; the test statistics are listed in Tables 2 and 3) and the results are quite sensitive to the failure to account for the firm-specilic effects in the estimation.
" The change from C to B -i. *; equivalent to a move from .seven to five using our scaling of SALOMON BROS. This represent.s a reduction of about one standard deviation from the variable's mean.
" We also explored specifications that included CEO-specitic rather than firm-specific effects. The coefficients on the political pressure variables were robust to this change, but the larger number of fixed effects to be estimated (183 CEOs rather than 87 firms) substantially reduced their precision.
"This increase represents slightly less than one standard deviation from the mean rate level.
Because the model includes year-fixed effects, the coefficients on the growth variables are identical to those that would be estimated from real growth rates. 
.8838
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year-and firm-fixed effects. 
SALOMON BROS
Circle size represents number of observations intensify political pressures on regulatory agencies and lead to the compression of CEO salaries.
We repeal the rate analysis for industrial rates in columns IV and V. Although the pattems are quite similar to those for residential rates, the estimated coefficients are smaller and cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. We combine the analysis of residential and industrial rates in column VI, which includes rate levels, growth, and lagged growth for both classes of users. The high degree of correlation between residential and industrial rates makes it difficult to estimate the individual coefficients with any precision." The point estimates suggest, however, that residential rather than industrial rate levels and growth may be the more important determinants of political pressure on executive compensation.'Ĉ olumn VII adds IND. CUSTOMERS, the proportion of a utility's total customers that are industrials, and IND. AVG. USE, the industrial per-capita gigawatt-hour consumption to the model in column VI. These variables are intended to capture differences in industrial user organization and influence. The coefficient on IND. CUSTOMERS is large and negative. A one-standard-deviation increase (one percentage point) in the proportion of a utility's customers that are industrial users reduces CEO compensation by 2.8% (standard erTor. 1.4%), all else equal. The coefficient on IND. AVG. USE is negative but statistically and economically insignificant."
Overall, F-tests indicate that the political constraint variables are jointly significant at the .1% level or better in each of the specifications included in Table 2 .^* In addition to the specifications reported in Table 2 , we have estimated models that aliow the pay-for-performance sensitivity as well as compensation level to depend upon the regulatory environment. These models attempt to test Jensen and Murphy's (1990) hypothesis that political pressures prevent salaries from being too strongly linked to stock market retums. We have implemented this by including interactions of either SALOMON BROS or \r\(RES. RATE) with the market retum variables.^^ There is no evidence that regulatory variation influences the pay-for-performance relationship within the utility industry, as the coefficients on the interaction terms were for the most part zero and statistically insignificant. We recognize, however, that intraindustry variation may not provide a very powerful test of the Jensen and Murphy hypothesis.
Finally, we analyze the effect on executive compensation of state public utility commission and commissioner attributes. Although the theory linking these attributes to the consumer or investor orientation of the agency is not well developed, we include in Table 3 the expected signs of the relationships that we infer from the previous literature's discussion and results (Navarro. 1982; Hagerman and Ratchford. 1978; Smiley and Greene. 1983; and Costello. 1984 ).* The coefficient estimates reported in Table  3 generally bear out the conjectured relationship between the commission attributes and CEO salaries. CEOs of utilities in states with elected commissions are paid less than CEOs in states where commissions are appointed. The coefficient on ELECTED in column VIII implies that a CEO whose company operates in a state with elected commissioners earns 18% less than a similarly situated CEO whose company operates in a state with appointed commissioners. The coefficients on the other variables tend to be less significant in both economic and statistical terms. For example, a one-year increase in the term of the commissioners who regulate a utility implies a 1.5% increase in compensation.-*' Columns IX and X introduce SALOMON BROS and the rate level and growth variables, respectively. Except for in (CHAIR SALARY) , the coefficients on the commission attribute variables are relatively robust to the inclusion of these variables. Further, the coefficients on SALOMON BROS in columns IX and X are similar to the coefficient on this variable in a specification in which it is the only political pressure variable."-This indicates that the Salomon Brothers rankings capture attributes of a utility's political environment beyond those that are captured by the commission and commissioner attributes."*-' '"The lest statistics for columns Ito Vn are as follows: column I-F(l,798) = 18.48, column H-F(2,797) = 11.09, column in-F(4,795) = 6.27, column IV-F(2.797) = 9.28, column V-F(4.795) = 5.14, column VI-F(7,792) -4.53, column VII-F{9,790) = 4.32.
" We have also experimented with interactions of market retum variables with dummy variables categorizing the regulatory regime (e.g.. Salomon grades above or below various cutoffs).
* None of these studies analyzed a variable similar to PUBLIC. Following the reasoning behind the coefficient on ELECTED, we hypothesize that commissioners who were previously employed in the public sector (for example, as state senators) will be more .sensitive to public sentiment and, therefore, less likely to regulate companies with CEOs who are highly paid.
•" The results in Table 3 arc sensitive lo the inclusion of firm-fixed effects atid should be interpreted wilh caution. The coefficients are identified from intrafirm time-series variation in the variables, which tends to be quite limited for the commission attribute variables. For example, only five utilities record changes in ELECTED during the period covered by our dataset.
••-In a specification identical to the one reported in column I of Table 2 run on the subsample of the dataset used in Table 3 . the coefficient on SALOMON BROS was -.020 (.005).
" The political constraint coefficients in each specification n Table 3 are jointly significant at the 15% level or better. The test statistics are as follows: column VIII-F(5,699) = 1,70, column IX-F(6,698) = 3.22, column X-F(9,695) = 3.35. .8914
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year-and firm-fixed effects.
Conclusion
• We find strong evidence that CEO compensation within the electric utility industry changes with the regulatory environment in which firms operate, consistent with the operation of political pressures that place significant constraints on executive compensation. CEOs are paid less when their firms operate in regulatory environments that favor consumers over company shareholders. They are paid less when their rates (particularly residential rates) are high, and less when their rates are rising rapidly, even from a relatively low base. CEOs of utilities operating in states with elected commissioners are paid significantly less than CEOs operating in states with appointed commissioners. Overall, these results are consistent with the use of the regulatory process to highlight and constrain CEO compensation.
These findings amplify and reinforce the conclusions reached by Joskow. Rose, and Shepard (1993) in their interindustry study of regulatory effects on executive pay: Economic regulation appears to provide an effective mechanism through which public concerns about executive compensation can be translated into political and regulatory action, and ultimately into reduced CEO pay. This suggests that recent efforts by Congress, the SEC, and FASB to increase the visibility of CEO compensation may further increase the political pressures on CEOs across all industries and may provide some additional constraint on compensation arrangements. Whether this limits the ability of CEOs to extract excessive rents from their boards of directors or leads to adverse incentive and allocative effects by reducing compensation from optimal levels depends on the relationship of unconstrained compensation levels to optimal compensation arrangements. Without credible research results on this question, the welfare effect of additional poHtical constraints on executive pay will remain unknown.
Appendix follows. 
